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NOTES AND COMMENTS
EXCLUDING FROM EVIDENCE FINGERPRINTS TAKEN AFTER
AN UNLAWFUL ARREST*
THE use of two seemingly unrelated evidentiary principles-the Mallory
rule and the doctrine excluding tangible evidence obtained pursuant to an
unlawful arrest-to forbid federal courts from admitting fingerprints taken after
such an arrest seems an unwarranted judicial exercise in policing law en-
forcement agents. Mallory 1 prohibits the admission in federal courts of in-
criminating statements made by persons who, after arrest (lawful or unlaw-
ful), are unnecessarily detained by police prior to arraignment. 2 Although
Mallory is usually considered a method of discouraging coerced confessions or
delayed arraignments, 3 the rule may also deter illegal arrests. 4 An arrest is
lawful, absent a warrant, only if the arresting officer has "probable cause"
to believe that the suspect has committed a crimeY By forcing the policc to
bring a prisoner promptly before a commissioner for arraignment, Mallory
tends to prevent them from ignoring the probable-cause requirement and at-
*Bynum v. United States, 262 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
1. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
2. See Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1003, 1009-13 (1959). The rule was the last step in
an evolutionary process which began with the prohibition against involuntary confessions,
and was extended by McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), to exclude con-
fessions obtained during periods conducive to police coercion. See 43 VA. L. Riv. 915
(1957). Since McNabb, commitment before a commissioner "without unnecessary delay"
has become an imperative for federal officers. FED. R. CRlm. P. 5(a).
3. See, e.g., Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1003, 1011-12 (1959); cf. 47 COLUm. L. R.v.
1214 (1947) (discussing McNabb). Although the Mallory Court seems to be saying
that unnecessary delay alone evokes exclusion, some lower courts still insist that the
unlawful detention must first be shown to have induced the statements before they will be
excluded. See Trilling v. United States, 260 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Dailey v. United
States, 261 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1958) (dictum), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 969 (1959); 43
VA. L. RFv. 915, 925 (1957).
4. Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1003, 1024-25 (1959). Mallory itself directs part of its
attack toward arrests made without probable cause and the use of "an interrogating pro-
cess at police headquarters in order to determine whom they should charge before a con-
mitting magistrate on 'probable cause.'" 354 U.S. at 456.
5. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) ; Mills v. United States, 196 F2d 600, 601 (D.C. Cir.
1952). The fourth amendment requires a showing of probable cause before a warrant
is issued, but does not govern the power to arrest without a warrant. Perkins, The Law,
of Arrest, 25 IowA L. REv. 201, 213 (1940). But courts have required the same showing
of probable cause for arrests without warrant on the theory that facts insufficient to
support a warrant should be equally insufficient to support an arrest without one. I
ALEXANDER, ARREST § 74 (1949) ; Orfield, Warrant of Arrest and Summons Upon Com-
plaint it Federal Criminal Procedure, 27 U. CINc. L. REv. 1, 30 (1958).
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tempting to extract a confession during a protracted interrogation which will
not only establish probable cause but also furnish evidence for conviction.0
Deterrence of unlawful arrests is also the aim of the federal rules that searches
and seizures incident to such arrests are themselves unlawful,7 and that any
evidence so acquired is inadmissible.8 In this manner, individuals are pro-
tected from improper arrests designed solely to obtain evidence.0 Although
both the Mallory and search-and-seizure rules thus have a deterrent effect on
unlawful arrests, courts rarely relate the two,' 0 and usually confine the first
to confessional evidence and the second to tangibles." The effect of an illegal
arrest on evidence that does not fit neatly into either category is a relatively
open question.' 2 Thus an accused fingerprinted during routine booking may
claim that these prints should be excluded from evidence on the grounds that
the arrest was illegal. The court must then decide whether the policies under-
lying these rules support their extension to evidence of this kind.
6. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 451-53 (1957), Comment, 68 YALE L.J.
1003, 1024-25 (1959) ; see Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 414 (1948) ; Watson v.
United States, 249 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Arrest on suspicion and subsequent
questioning for the purpose of obtaining confessions which would themselves establish
probable cause have been defended before the Supreme Court as "usual police procedure."
Upshaw v. United States, supra at 414. The number of detentions on suspicion in the
United States, while unknown, is generally thought to be high. Foote, Safeguards in the
Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. Ray. 16, 20-27 (1957). See generally Hall, The Low of
Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. Cm. I. REv. 345 (1936).
7. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Wrightson v. United States, M
F2d 556, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; see 1 ALE-xANDER, op. cit. stpra note 5, §§ 132(b), 133(b).
8. Wrightson v. United States, supra note 7, at 560; 2 UNDERUML, CnrIxNAL Evi-
DENcE § 415 (5th ed. 1956). The exclusionary rule applies not only to searches accompany-
ing illegal arrests but, implementing the fourth amendment, to any unreasonable search.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) ; Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
9. See Bolt v. United States, 2 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
10. See Perlman, Dite Process and the Admissibility of Etidence, 64 HARv. I Rsv.
1304, 1308-11 (1951).
11. While an occasional court has utilized search-and-seizure rules to exclude con-
fessional evidence, Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940), and
nonconfessional evidence is sometimes excluded solely because obtained during an un-
lawful prearraignment detention, Watson v. United States, 249 F2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ;
United States v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1956), 66 YALE L.J. 270, courts that have
crossed the traditional lines aclmowledge the possibility that the two rules are confined
to two different types of evidence, Nueslein v. District of Columbia, mupra at 691-94;
United States v. Klapholz, supra at 498. It is generally accepted that the rules are so
confined. See 60 Hnav. L. Rav. 1145 (1947).
12. Obtaining evidence directly from the body of an accused presents difficult classi-
fication problems. Cases of this nature are frequently decided on entirely different
theories. Compare Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (stomach pumping analogized
to coerced confessions, declared violation of due process), with United States v. Willis, 85
F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949) (stomach pumping for evidence declared violation of fourth
amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure).
13. Fingerprinting has rarely been attacked on grounds of illegal search or coerced
confession. Wigmore defines a confession as "... . an acknowledgement in express words
... of the truth of the guilty fact charged or of some essential part of it." 3 Wi,.tonr.
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In Bynum v. United States,4 defendant was arrested for robbery; his finger-
prints were taken when he was booked. They were later found to match those
left at the scene of the crime. When, at trial, the Government attempted to
introduce both sets of prints, Bynum maintained that the fingerprints taken
at the booking were inadmissible as products of an illegal arrest. The trial
court, finding the prints relevant and trustworthy evidence, admitted them
without regard to the arrest's validity. But the court of appeals held that,
assuming the arrest was made without probable cause, any evidence obtained
in the course of the arrest must be examined in the light of the Mallory and
search-and-seizure rules. Proceeding to conduct this examination, the court
conceded that prints were distinguishable from both "statements given during
detention" and "articles taken from a prisoner's possession."'1 The court
noted, however, that the exclusionary rules were designed to prevent law en-
forcement officials from deriving an "evidentiary advantage" from evidence
"which the public authorities have caused an arrested person to yield to them
during an illegal detention."'16 The policy underlying these rules compelled
the prints' exclusion, the court held, since "if one such product of illegal de-
tention is proscribed, by the same token all should be proscribed,' 17
By turning the decision on a finding of "illegal detention," the court ap-
parently injected a new meaning into that phrase. The Mallory rule, predi-
cated on the possibility of coercion during an unnecessarily delayed detention
before arraignment, brands such detentions "unlawful."1 8 But, since no pre-
EVIDENCE § 821, at 238 (3d ed. 1940). But see State v. Watson, 114 Vt. 543, 49 A2d 174
(1946). When assailed on search-and-seizure grounds, fingerprinting has been justified
as a "slight interference ... which must be borne in the common interest." United States
v. Kelly, 55 F2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1932); see U.S. F.DERAL BuREAu oF INvWSTxGATON,
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINGERPRINTS (1939). Physical examination of the person for identi-
fication purposes is sometimes thought to be completely outside the scope of the fourth
amendment, which is said to be confined to chattels and papers. Ladd & Gibson, Legal-
Medical Aspects of Blood Tests To Determine Intoxication, 29 VA. L. Ray, 749, 765
(1943). Attacks on grounds of compulsory self-incrimination have also failed. United
States v. lacullo, 226 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1955); see Seder, Compulsory Fingerprinting and
the Self-Incrimination Privilege, 37 J. Clm. L. & CRuMINOLOGy 511 (1947); 2 WnAI(-
TON, CRIMINAL EViDENCE § 659 (12th ed. 1955).
14. 262 F2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
15. Id. at 467.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 451-53 (1957); see United States v.
Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 69-70 (1944) ; Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1003, 1011 (1959). McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), attempted to reduce the opportunities for police
brutality and coercion directed at securing a confession by excluding incriminating state-
ments elicited from an accused during a period of undue delay prior to his arraignment.
While subsequent cases indicated that the unlawful delay must actually induce the con-
fession, Mallory apparently held that such delay alone would evoke exclusion. See Coin-
ment, 68 YALE L.J. 1003, 1007-08 (1959). The discussion in Mallory of the length of
the delay and opportunity for coercion it provides indicates that the Court was concerned
with periods of time long enough to allow the use of psychological pressure as part of an
extended process of inquiry.
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arraignment delay was shown in Bynum, the only factor that could have
rendered defendant's detention illegal was the preceding unlawful arrest. An
unlawful arrest itself does not give rise to a similar opportunity for coercion,10
but is but one factor which courts consider when determining a confession's
admissibility.20 Since "illegal detention" in the Mallory sense was, therefore,
an inapposite standard for excluding fingerprints, Mallory precedents were
seemingly used in Bynum only as examples of judicial deterrents of unlawful
arrests. Correspondingly, the search-and-seizure-arrest cases cited by the court
were apparently intended as further examples of deterrents. Through finger-
print exclusion, the court was attempting to add another "effective sanction"
against unauthorized arrests.21
But, before creating a new category of excluded evidence, the court should
have determined the effectiveness of the sanction, rather than assuming it;
"the question is whether protection for the individual would not be gained
at a disproportionate loss of protection for society."22 Exclusion of evidence
19. An unlawful arrest would not afford the police a greater opportunity to interro-
gate illegally than would a lawful one. Furthermore, fingerprints and other physical
evidence can be forced from an accused in a matter of seconds so that Mallory, allowing
a "brief delay" before arraignment, could not be effective in deterring such tactics. 354
U.S. at 454-55.
The District of Columbia Circuit itself has declared, subsequent to Mallory, that
an illegal arrest will not automatically compel the exclusion of a subsequent confession.
Smith v. United States, 254 F2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
20. See Dailey v. United States, 261 F2d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 1958). See generally 2
A=XANDER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 400, at 1237-53; 43 VA. L. Rv. 915 (1957).
21. 262 F2d at 467. Since the Mallory and search-and-seizure-arrest rules do not
protect the defendant who invokes them from violations of his rights that have already
occurred, they are preventive rather than remedial. See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,
443, 448-51, 282 P2d 905, 910, 913-15 (1955) ; Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 513, 141
A2d 46, 50 (1958); Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1003, 1005-06 (1959); Comment, 58
YALE L.. 144, 151-52 (1948). No facts are available to prove the effectiveness of these
rules in deterring illegal police activities. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 135
(1954); WooD & VAIT, CRImE AzND Irs TRE.ATmENT 393 (1941); Waite, Police Regu-
lation by Rules of Ezidence, 42 McH. L. Rrv. 679, 685 (1944). Opponents of the ex-
clusionary rules maintain that they have no deterrent effect on police activities at all.
Inbau, Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions, 52 Nw. U.L R-v. 77, 78
(1957) ; Peterson, Restrictions in the Law of Search and Seiure, 52 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 46,
56 (1957).
It is arguable that exclusion should follow any unwarranted invasion of a defendant's
constitutional right to privacy even if it affords no deterrent value, but the Supreme Court
has not gone this far. Evidence extracted by certain methods, however, represents a some-
what analogous situation, and the use of such evidence to secure a conviction is violative
of due process. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (stomach pumping). But
if the extraction of blood from an accused does not "shock the conscience," see Breithaupt
v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), it is unlikely that taking fingerprints would be any more
objectionable.
22. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 n2 (1949) ; see McCoramcx, EvwENcE § 138
(1954). The fourth amendment does not provide any method of enforcing its prohibition
on unreasonable searches and seizures, which also covers unlawful arrests, see Albrecht
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best deters unlawful arrests when a causal relationship between the evidence
excluded and the purpose of the arrest is shown. If law enforcement agents
realize that evidence will be unavailable in court, they will presumably re-
frain from making unlawful arrests designed to obtain that evidence. 23 Ar-
rests for other purposes would not be directly deterred by the threat of ex-
clusion.24 Admittedly, any exclusion will have some deterrent effect. Police
may be more reluctant to make arrests of questionable legality if the prose-
cution will be deprived of all evidence, even that fortuitously acquired. But
in these circumstances deterrence is greatly reduced, while the balance between
individual protection and society's interest in convicting the guilty would tip
toward the latter.
25
v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5 (1927) ; "the federal exclusionary rule . . . is a judicially
created rule of evidence which Congress might negate," Wolf v. Colorado, supra at 39-40
(concurring opinion of Black, J.). This interpretation has been accepted by lower courts.
See, e.g., Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745, 748 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. decied, 356
U.S. 914 (1958).
Courts adopting exclusionary rules frequently justify their decision by striking the
balance in favor of individual protection. See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 449-50,
282 P.2d 905, 914 (1955); Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 166, 224 S.W. 860,
866 (1920) ; Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1940). Compare
Inbau, supra note 21, at 79; 8 WIGMIORE, EvioExcE § 2184, at 36-37 (3d ed. 1940).
23. See Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class
Constitutional Right?, 25 IiN. L.J. 259, 306-13 (1950). But the deterrent effect of ex-
clusion has never been empirically demonstrated. See note 21 supra. Perhaps the police
are more interested in establishing a large number of arrests than in securing convictions.
See generally HoPKINs, OuR LAwLEss PoUcE 65-66, 88-99 (1931); Foote, slipra note
6, at 20-27. Nevertheless, courts assume that exclusion has a definite deterrent value. See,
e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28, 31 (majority opinion of Frankfurter, J.); id.
at 40 (concurring opinion of Black, J.) ; id. at 42 (dissenting opinion of Murphy, J.)
id. at 47 (dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J.).
24. The principle of deterrence assumes that police who would otherwise perform an
illegal act will refrain from performing such act if they realize that its purpose will be
negated by subsequent judicial action. Since the exclusionary rules are invoked as to
evidence that police acquire illegally, it follows that the threat of exclusion will operate
as intended only if an excludable piece of evidence is the target of the police activity, and
if the police are previously aware of the rule and its threat to the success of their venture.
A few courts seem to have recognized these limitations by refusing to apply the rules in
situations where the illegality was obviously not directed toward the acquisition of In-
criminating evidence. See United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944); McGuire v.
United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927) ; Giacolone v. United States, 13 F.2d 108 (9th Cir.
1926); Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 141 A.2d 46 (1958). Compare Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), with United States v. Wallace &
Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793 (1949). On the importance of showing a causal connection
between the illegal act and subsequent exclusion, see Note, 66 YALE L.J. 270, 280-83 (1956).
An exclusionary rule would have no effect on a large number of those unlawful arrests
made not for purposes of prosecution but rather to get the individuals off the streets or
to encourage them to leave town. See Hall, supra note 6, at 367-75.
25. See Note, 66 YALE L.J. 270, 282-83 (1956). Aimless attempts at deterrence are
subject to the same objections as the ever present threat of a suit for false arrest-indi-
vidual policemen may hesitate in situations that demand firm and prompt action. See
Coakley, Restrictions in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 2, 4-6, 12-13 (1957) ;
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Although federal courts applying exclusionary rules rarely analyze the
causal relationship between arrest and exclusion,26 nearly every case assumes
that whenever evidence is acquired in conjunction with an unlawful arrest,
obtention of the evidence was the purpose of the arrest.-" This assumption
Peterson, supra note 21, at 50-55; cf. State v. Mara, 96 N.H. 463, 78 A-2d 922 (1951).
The legality of an arrest depends largely on the existence of probable cause, and since
this is a technical concept on which even judges sometimes disagree, the typical peace
officer will often be confronted with situations in which he is unsure of how a court
will react. Coakley, supra at 12-13; see Comment, 3 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 55, 63-64 (1955).
Judge Cardozo once said of the exclusionary rule:
The pettiest peace officer would have it in his power, through overzeal or in-
discretion, to confer immunity upon an offender for crimes the most flagitious. A
room is searched against the law, and the body of a murdered man is found. If
the place of discovery may not be proved, the other circumstances may be in-
sufficient to connect the defendant with the crime... Like instances can be multi-
plied.
People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 23-24, 150 N.E. 5,5, 588 (1926).
26. When the presumption that a confession obtained during an illegal detention
was coerced is controverted, however, courts have discussed the relation between ex-
clusion and the purpose of an illegal detention. See, e.g., Upshaw v. United States, 335
U.S. 410, 414 (1948) ; Trilling v. United States, 260 F.2d 677, 683-85 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ;
Allen v. United States, 202 F2d 329, 334 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 869 (1952).
Since a search is, by definition, executed to obtain evidence, little need exists for courts
to discuss the relation of exclusion to the purpose of the search. See 1 AL XANDER, op.
cit. supra note 5, § 125a, at 541.
27. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456 (1957); Upshaw v. United States,
335 U.S. 410, 414 (1948); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) ("an
arrest may not be used as a pretext for a search for evidence") ; Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931) (condemning unlawful arrest and accompany-
ing "general exploratory search in the hope that evidence of crime might be found");
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 663 (1886) (" 'unreasonable searches and seizures'...
are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against
himself'); Trilling v. United States, 260 F.2d 677, 684 & n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ; Watson
v. United States, 249 F.2d 106, 108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; cf. Bratcher v. United States,
149 F.2d 742, 745-46 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 885 (1945); Note, 66 YALE UJ.
270, 280 (1956). But see Dailey v. United States, 261 F.2d 870, 873 (5th Cir. 1958).
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959), 34 WAsH. L. REv. 437, makes it clear
that the fourth amendment protects the right to resist official intrusion into privacy
which has as its design the securing of information ...which may be used to
effect a further deprivation of life or liberty or property ... [I]t %as on the issue
of the right to be-secure from searches for e-idence to be used it criminal prose-
cutions or for forfeitures that the great battle for fundamental liberty w-as fought.
(Emphasis added.)
Some states hold that tangible evidence will not be excluded unless defendant proves
that it was the object of the challenged search and seizure, see People v. Cahan, 44
Cal. 2d 434, 441-42 n.*, 282 P.2d 905, 909 n.4 (1955) (distinguishing coerced confessions),
or arrest, see Milton v. City of McComb, 200 Miss. 15, 26 So. 2d 463 (1946). See also
Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 NJ. 506, 141 A.2d 46 (1958).
When technical violations of the search-and-seizure law occur, some federal courts
have held that exclusion is not required if the violations were not causally related to
the seizing of evidence. See Note, 66 YALz LJ. 270, 282 & nn.42-43.
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apparently is based on a second: that police, hoping to establish probable
cause with the fruits of the search, often arrest and search unlawfully. 28 Thus
tcourts afford complete protection to defendants who ordinarily would be
unable to prove the arrest's purpose and hinder unlawful arrests designed to
procure evidence. The Mallory rule similarly assumes that lengthy prearraign-
ment interrogation is designed solely to extract confessions. 9
Courts can not assume, however, that fingerprints are the object of an un-
lawful arrest. Rather, they are taken to establish the arrested person's identity
during routine booking procedure. 30 Even if the fingerprints were sought as
evidence to link the suspect to the crime, they could be easily obtained without
arrest. State and national investigatory agencies possess extensive fingerprint
files which they make available to local law enforcement authorities.8 ' And
modern criminological techniques allow the police easily to obtain fingerprints
from items touched by the suspect without the necessity of arrest. 2 Further,
28. See Wrightson v. United States, 222 F.2d 556, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
29. Proving coercion may be an almost insurmountable burden for the accused. See
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1958) (dissenting opinion) ; Note, 66 YAM
L.J. 270, 278 & n.33; Bader, Coerced Confessions and the Due Process Clause, 15 BaooK -
LYN L. REv. 51, 70 (1948).
30. In addition to establishing identity at the time of arrest, fingerprints are useful
in aiding the apprehension of escaped prisoners, and in ascertaining whether the defendant
has been previously convicted where second offenders are liable to different sentences.
See United States v. Kelly, 55 F2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932).
31. Continuous liaison with state and local law enforcement agencies provides the
Federal Bureau of Investigation with a means of building the federal files and, at the same
time, aiding local crime detection. See McGovern v. Van Riper, 140 N.J. Eq. 341, 344, 346,
54 A2d 469, 471-72 (Ch. 1947). The FBI has nearly 154,000,000 fingerprint cards oi
file, and receives more than 20,000 a day. N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1959, p. 10, col. 7. See
generally HooVER, CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE IDENTIFICATION
DIVISION (1937); COOKE, THE BLUE BOOK OF CRIME (14th ed. 1939).
Legislation establishing state identification bureaus and outlining identification pro-
cedures have given police considerable freedom in fingerprinting suspects. See, e.g., N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 53:1-12 to -20.4 (1955); Roesch v. Ferber, 48 N.J. Super. 231, 137 A.2d
61 (App. Div. 1957). These statutes, together with "disorderly persons" statutes allow-
ing the arrest of anyone "who cannot give a good account of himself," permit the finger-
printing of a very large number of people. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :170-1 (1955);
City of Columbus v. McCrory, 49 N.E.2d 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942) ; Note, 59 YALE L.J.
1351 (1950). On the desirability of instituting a universal system of fingerprinting
registration, see Kidd, The Right To Take Fingerprints, Measurements, and Photographs,
8 CALIF. L. Rxv. 25, 38-40 (1919).
32. An individual's identity can be conclusively established from only one fingerprint,
even if it is partially obscured. See BE WSTsR, FINGERPRINTS 79 (1936) ; COOKE, op. cit.
supra note 31, at 25; HOOVER, op. cit. supra note 31, at 24-27. If his fingerprints are avail-
able from investigatory agencies or other sources, identification may be accomplished with-
out arresting the individual, by comparing such fingerprints with those found at the
scene of the crime. See Trilling v. United States, 260 F.2d 677, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
Recent developments in the methods of "dusting" latent fingerprints to render them
visible for comparison enable investigators with a spray can and some transparent tape to
"lift" fingerprints of virtually anyone from objects he has touched without arresting him.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1959, p. 29, col. 3; The New Yorker, Oct. 17, 1959, pp. 34-36.
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police would not arrest on suspicion only for fingerprints because the risks
of losing other evidence through an unlawful arrest outweigh any advantage
prints might offer.
Since exclusion of fingerprints taken after an unlawful arrest will not deter
such arrests, they should be admitted unless exclusion is justified on other
.grounds. As a punishment of the police, the effectiveness of exclusion is
confined to the possibility of statistical embarrassment resulting from an un-
successful prosecution. 33 Moreover, punishment of law enforcement officers
has never been considered a proper function of judicial rules of evidence.34 As a
means of redressing the wrong perpetrated on a particular individual, exclusion
is also inappropriate. First, the remedy is not available to all persons. Ex-
clusion will not benefit an accused if: he is innocent and the prints are not
incriminating; he is never brought to trial; he is tried and the prints are
never introduced; or his guilt can be established without the use of finger-
prints.35 Additionally, fingerprint exclusion which would result in acquitting
a wrongdoer is an inappropriate method of granting relief to an individual or
protecting the integrity of the criminal process since the remedy may often be
disproportionate to the injury to society.3 '
33. Surveys of criminal justice in larger cities are usually based on the number of
arrests that result in ultimate conviction. A high "mortality" rate of unsuccessful arrests
indicates either that guilty persons are escaping punishment, or that innocent ones are
being arrested. These figures sometimes cause police commissioners to bring pressure
to bear on officers who are careless in their standards of arrest. See HoPxi.s, op. cit. supra
note 23, at 79-86. But too much emphasis on a good arrest-to-conviction ratio may cause
a juggling of statistics by the police department with the result that such figures becunte
meaningless. See Foote, supra note 6, at 20-27.
34. See United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 70-71 (1944); 8 Wiwaorx EvwazcE
§ 2183, at 4-5 (3d ed. 1940). Constitutional authority for courts to discipline the police
is not established. Inbau, supra note 21, at 77. If punishment is desired, perhaps it should
be administered by a separate office created by the legislature. See Peterson, supra note
21, at 62-63.
35. See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 443, 282 P.2d 905, 910 (1955); Comment,
58 YALE L.J. 144, 153-54 (1948). Although exclusion may protect the defendant from
the aftermath of an illegal invasion of his privacy, it does not in any real sense compensate
him for the invasion. Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 NJ. 506, 514, 141 A.2d 40, 50 (1958).
Nevertheless, commentators are prone to talk of the rule in terms of "remedy." See
Parsons, State-Federal Crossfire in Search and Seizure and Self Incrimination, 42 CoR:.ma.
L.Q. 346, 355 (1957).
36. See Comment, 58 Y.ALE L.J. 144, 153-54 (1948). But see 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1330,
1334 (1959) (exclusion of fingerprints taken after illegal arrest falls "within the spirit
of the fourth amendment"). Judge Cardozo's apprehensions that murderers might be
turned loose on society as a result of an exclusionary rule, see note 25 supra, might
today be allayed by the Supreme Court's acknowledgement that the rule should perhaps
be applied with "indulgence" if the police were dealing with "crimes of violence' as
opposed to lotteries. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460 (194S). Some
states have restricted the application of the rule to misdemeanors, see Salsburg v.
Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 547 n.2 (1954), or other minor offenses, see, e.g., Green v. State,
38 Ala. App. 189, 79 So. 2d 555 (1955) (illegal seizure of prohibited liquors creates
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Moreover, exclusion of illegally obtained fingerprints would be ineffectual
if fingerprints obtained from other sources were not also excluded. After the
police realize that fingerprints obtained in the course of an unlawful arrest are
incriminating, they may acquire identical fingerprints from any one of a
number of available sources.3 7 At trial, they will attempt to introduce the sub-
sequently acquired fingerprints rather than those originally obtained. These
fingerprints could be excluded only if the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
were applicable.35 Under this doctrine, any evidence gained as a result of
information acquired from illegally obtained evidence is itself inadmissible. 0
The doctrine will not operate, however, if the police can show that they would
have obtained "untainted" fingerprints even had they not taken fingerprints
after an unlawful arrest.40
In the Bynum situation, the very fact of arrest indicates that the individual
was suspect; under routine investigatory procedures the police would have
obtained his prints even without arrest. Or, the police might have forwarded
the prints revealed at the crime site to investigatory agencies able to identify
them.41 Thus, the police would and could have acquired defendant's finger-
prints, and ascertained his identity in any event. Indeed, the Bynum court
itself indicated that fingerprints not taken at the time of arrest would be
exception to general rule admitting illegally seized evidence) ; cf. McCoRiuxcx, EviDENcSE
§ 138, at 293 (1954).
37. See note 31 supra.
38. This doctrine was first named by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
39. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920).
But the doctrine does not apply to evidence obtained as a result of a coerced confession.
2 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 13, § 357, at 58; Grant, Constitutional Basis of the Rule
Forbidding the Use of Illegally Seized Evidence, 15 So. CAL. L. REV. 60, 63 (1941); see
Note, 53 HARV. L. REV. 863 n.4 (1940).
40. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, supra note 39, at 392.
Further, a tenuous causal connection between the tainted evidence and that sought to
be introduced may be insufficient to bring the situation within the scope of the rule. See
Sullivan v. United States, 219 F.2d 760, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1955). The necessary causal re-
quirement is sometimes compared to the concept of "proximate cause." See Bernstein,
The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, 37 ILu, L. Rzv. 99, 106 (1942) ; Note, 24 InD. L.J. 245,
251-52 (1949).
Under circumstances where it would be pointless to make the Government ignore Its
wrongfully gained knowledge and go through the motions of acquiring the same knowledge
lawfully, the courts have been willing to accept that tainted evidence. See Somer v. United
States, 138 F.2d 790, 792 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Parts Mfg. Corp. v. Lynch, 129 F.2d 841, 842-
43 (2d Cir. 1942); Rouda v. United States, 10 F.2d 916, 918 (2d Cir. 1926).
41. Before Bynum's arrest, the police knew that he was the owner of the car in which
the complainant's assailants were traveling. Brief for Appellee, p. 3. They also had the
fingerprints that were taken from the complainant's own automobile which had been
Adriven for a while by one of the assailants. Id. at 4. By sending these fingerprints and
Bynun's name, as suspect, to the F.B.I., positive identification of Bynum as the owner
of the fingerprints found in the car would have resulted.
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admissible upon retrial.42 And if the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine were
applied, law enforcement officers might be deterred, not from making unlaw-
ful arrests, but from obtaining arrested parties' fingerprints, often the most
important and trustworthy evidence linking a guilty suspect to his crime,43
or exonerating an innocent one.4"
42. See 262 F2d at 468-69. Bynum's fingerprints were, in fact, subsequently ob-
tained from the F.B.I., and, upon retrial, were used to establish his presence at the scene
of the crime. His reconviction was affirmed, Bynum v. United States, No. 15373, D.C. Cir.,
Jan. 7, 1960, the court ruling that "an older fingerprint in the files of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, in no way connected with the unlawful arrest," was admissible evidence,
id. at 2.
43. The reliability of fingerprints in establishing identity has long been recognized
by the courts and by commentators. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 69 (2d
Cir. 1932); People v. Jennings, 252 I1. 534, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911); Mann v. State, 49
Okla. Crim. 210, 292 Pac. 883 (1930) ; Kidd, stpra note 31; Note, 80 U. P.. L. Rnv. 887
(1932).
44. See Bartletta v. McFeeley, 107 N.J. Eq. 141, 143, 152 At. 17, 18 (Ch. 1930).
